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Abstract: By taking an argument to consist of one premise and one conclusion, the Periodic Table of 
Arguments (PTA) excludes from its conceptualization the element traditionally called the ‘connecting premise’ 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA) is a recently developed categorization of argument 
that integrates the existing dialectical and rhetorical accounts of argument schemes, fallacies, 
and other means of persuasion into a systematic and comprehensive whole (Wagemans 2016, 
2019). Like any overview of argument types, the PTA can, in principle, be used to develop 
methods for the production, the analysis, and the evaluation of argumentative discourse. So 
far, it has primarily been used for analytical purposes.1 
Different from many other approaches, the PTA takes an argument to consist of one 
conclusion and one premise. In doing so, it excludes what is traditionally called the 
‘connecting premise’ or ‘missing premise’ from being conceptualized as an integrating part 
of an argument. One reason for doing that is to avoid an infinite regress problem: if the link 
between the premise and the conclusion is added to the argument as a premise, the link 
between that linking premise and the conclusion should also be added as a premise, ad 
infinitum (see Wagemans 2014, pp. 15-17). 
Another, perhaps even more important reason for working with this minimal 
conceptualization of argument is to dissuade the analyst of argumentative discourse from 
projecting into the discourse all kinds of preconceived ideas about what an argument should 
consist of to be ‘correct’, ‘valid’, or ‘complete’ in any sense of the term. For such projection, 
if not accounted for by explicit methodological considerations, invites the analyst to the 
hermeneutic activity of ‘hineininterpretieren’. This is problematic because any crossing of the 
border between providing a theoretically informed description and giving a subjective 
reconstruction of the original discourse may interfere with the subsequent assessment of the 
argument under scrutiny. 
After having given a theoretical and a practical reason for why the PTA takes an 
argument to consist of one conclusion and one premise, I would like to briefly indicate the 
consequences of this choice for applying the categorization for analytical purposes. I will do 
 
1 The argument categorization framework of the PTA has been integrated into the linguistic representation 
framework of Constructive Adpositional Grammars (CxAdGrams) (Gobbo and Wagemans 2019a, 2019b, 
2019c; Gobbo, Benini and Wagemans 2019) and it has been used for annotating argument schemes in natural 
discourse (Visser and Wagemans 2018; Visser et al. 2018, 2019, 2020). 
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so by contrasting its method for identifying arguments in natural discourse with the 
traditional method for doing so. 
Existing classifications of arguments developed within the field of argumentation 
theory usually consist of a list of argument schemes, each of which has a predefined set of 
characteristics.2 To determine the type of an argument found in natural discourse, this set of 
characteristics is used as an ideal model. The identification of the natural argument takes 
place by comparing the ideal to the real, and in case discrepancies are found, by subsequently 
using the ideal to reconstruct the real. In other words, the analyst uses the list of predefined 
argument schemes to find what should have been expressed in the original discourse but for 
unconscious, habitual, or strategic reasons has been expressed differently or remained 
completely absent from the discourse and to “repair” or “reconstruct” it accordingly. 
This traditional method raises several problems, which I will illustrate by imagining a 
predefined argument scheme that consists of one conclusion and three premises – see Figure 
1 – and an analyst who, in trying to match the elements of the scheme with the text under 
scrutiny, found the conclusion and premise 2 in the original discourse, but was not able to 
detect premise 1 in the original discourse (?) and found something that could be interpreted as 
an instantiation of premise 3 but was formulated in a slightly different way (premise 3’). 
 
predefined argument scheme  original discourse 
conclusion    conclusion     
premise 1     ? 
premise 2     premise 2 
premise 3    premise 3’ 
 
Figure 1. Abstract example of discrepancies between the ideal and the real 
  
Should the analyst now add an instantiation of premise 1 as a missing premise to the original 
discourse and correct the formulation of premise 3’ so as to achieve conformity with premise 
3? How to justify such reconstruction? Which hermeneutic considerations or interpretation 
rules allow the analyst to transform the original discourse to have it correspond with the 
predefined set of characteristics of the argument scheme from the list? And how to choose 
which of the argument schemes mentioned on the list is the most fitting one in the first place? 
How many discrepancies are allowed for the analyst to conclude that the identification of the 
argument type is still the right one? And even if there is only a minor discrepancy, why 
wouldn’t it be just another type of argument, one that is not yet mentioned in the list? 
These questions all point to the same problem of the traditional method of identifying 
argument types, namely that it is based on a comparison between the ideal and the real. There 
is a list of predefined types of argument and it is left to the analyst to compare the items on 
the list to the argument in the original discourse. On the basis of mostly implicit criteria for 
correspondence or similarity, the analyst then takes a subjective decision regarding the 
identification of the argument type. 
Different from such comparative approaches, the PTA takes a procedural approach to 
argument type identification and evaluation. This means that there are explicit instructions as 
to when, how and why the analyst should transform the original discourse. But it also means 
that there are no ‘missing premises’ that have to be added to the discourse only to comply 
with the arbitrary characteristics of some predefined argument scheme. This applies a fortiori 
to the ‘connecting premise’ that is meant to express the connection between premise and 
conclusion, for that would not only give rise to the problems about the justification of the 
 
2 See, e.g., Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Hastings (1962), Schellens (1985), Kienpointner (1992), van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), and Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008). 
pre conference version 
3 
 
argument type identification just described but also to the infinite regress problem described 
earlier. 
 Taking an argument to consist of one conclusion and one premise, however, also 
raises an important question. If the PTA excludes what is traditionally called the ‘connecting 
premise’ or ‘missing premise’ from its conceptualization of argument, how can the 
categorization be used to evaluate the quality of the connection between premise and 
conclusion? In this paper, I aim to answer that question by explaining how to derive the so-
called argumentative ‘lever’ (Wagemans 2019, p. 61) from the identification of the type of 
argument in terms of the theoretical framework of the PTA.3 
The paper is structured as follows. First, I expound the relevant aspects of the 
theoretical framework of the PTA, focusing on the role of the notions ‘argument form’ and 
‘argument substance’ in the description of the characteristics of the types of argument 
(Section 2). Next, I explain how the analyst can use the Argument Type Identification 
Procedure (ATIP) to formulate the argumentative lever based on an identification of the type 
of argument under scrutiny (Section 3). Then, I illustrate through an example how the analyst 
can use such a formulation of the lever to evaluate the quality of the connection between the 
premise and the conclusion of the argument (Section 4). Finally, I summarize the most 
important findings and indicate directions for further research (Section 5). 
 
2. Characteristics of natural arguments 
 
When viewed from a purely linguistic perspective, an analyst who found an argument in a 
text has found two statements and – on a lucky day – a connector. As soon as they label one 
of the statements as the ‘conclusion’ and the other as the ‘premise’, the perspective has 
already shifted from linguistics to pragmatics. For labelling statements with their 
argumentative function means to assume that one statement is doubted and the other is more 
certain in the eyes of an addressee, as well as taking the latter statement to be put forward by 
the arguer to establish or increase the acceptability of the former. These pragmatic insights 
are reflected in a wide range of descriptions of argument varying from Quintilian’s classical 
rhetorical definition of an argument as ‘the reason that, through things that are certain, 
provides credibility to that what is dubious (ratio per ea, quae certa sunt, fidem dubiis 
adferens) (Institutio oratoria 5, 10, 8 and 20)’ to van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s 
observation that the arguer ‘acts on the assumption that others either doubt or might doubt the 
acceptability of his standpoint’ and therefore that ‘the purpose of his discourse is to convince 
someone else of the acceptability of his standpoint’ (1992, p. 14).4 
 
Figure 2. An argument viewed from a linguistic and pragmatic perspective  
 
3 The paper partly builds on insights developed during the PTA-based specification of the ‘initial analysis’ and 
‘reasoning’ parts of the Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA) (Hinton 
and Wagemans, forthcoming) as well as the proposal for extending the practice of ‘fact-checking’ in the 
direction of ‘rhetoric-checking’ (Plug and Wagemans, forthcoming). I would like to express my gratitude to 
Martin Hinton and José Plug for their valuable input and criticisms during these research collaborations. 
4 For a short survey of classical and contemporary definitions of argument see Wagemans (2019, pp. 58-60).  
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Apparently, and this is also clear from the above general definition of argument, the analyst is 
only justified in calling a combination of statements an ‘argument’ and attributing the labels 
of ‘conclusion’ and ‘premise’ to these statements if it can be shown that there is some kind of 
leverage of acceptability going on from the premise to the conclusion. Now the big question 
to answer here is the following: “How does this leverage of acceptability take place?” How is 
it possible that the arguer, as soon as they assume the addressee to have some doubt 
concerning the acceptability of a particular statement, can provide another statement that 
makes the addressee accept the former? What is the underlying mechanism at work here? 
Within the theoretical framework of the PTA, this question is answered by 
hypothesizing the so-called ‘law of the common term’. This law states that the premise, in 
order to fulfil its pragmatic aim of rendering the conclusion (more) acceptable, should share 
exactly one common term with the conclusion. Expressed in mechanistic metaphoric, this 
common term functions as the ‘fulcrum’ of the leverage of acceptability taking place within 
the argument. 
Assuming that a statement consists of a subject and a predicate, the law of the 
common term yields two basic possibilities of argument forms. If the statements share the 
same linguistic subject, the argument has the form ‘a is X, because a is Y’ and is 
characterized as a ‘predicate argument’ (abbreviated as ‘pre’). In this case, the subject (a) 
functions as the fulcrum of the argument. A concrete example is Unauthorized downloading 
(a) is not theft (X), because unauthorized downloading (a) does not deprive the original 
owner of the use of an object (Y), which has unauthorized downloading (a) as its fulcrum.  
 The other basic possibility is when the common term is the predicate, which means 
the argument has the form ‘a is X, because b is X’. In this case, the predicate (X) is the 
fulcrum. Within the framework of the PTA, such arguments are called ‘subject arguments’ 
(abbreviated as ‘sub’). An example is Cycling on the grass (a) is prohibited (X), because 
walking on the grass (b) is prohibited (X), which has is prohibited (X) as its fulcrum. 
 In natural argumentative discourse, any statement can be expressed as a proposition or 
as an assertion. The difference between the two modes of expression is that in the latter, the 
arguer’s doxastic attitude regarding the statement is explicitly present in the discourse. The 
statement The president is doing a great job, for example, is expressed as a proposition, while 
the statement I believe that the president is doing a great job is expressed as an assertion. 
While both statements contain the proposition the president is doing a great job, the assertion 
additionally contains the doxastic attitude marker I believe that (see Figure 3). 
 
proposition The president is doing a great job 
 
     proposition 
 
  assertion I believe that the president is doing a great job 
 
    doxastic   proposition 
attitude marker 
 
Figure 3. The same statement expressed as a proposition and as an assertion 
 
Within the theoretical framework of the PTA, the distinction between propositions and 
assertions is used to characterize arguments as ‘first-order arguments’ (abbreviated as ‘1’) or 
‘second-order arguments’ (abbreviated as ‘2’). If the propositions of the statements share a 
common subject or predicate, as in the examples above, the argument is characterized as a 
‘first-order predicate argument’ (‘1 pre’) or ‘first-order subject argument’ (‘1 sub’) 
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respectively. If the statements have the proposition of the conclusion as their common term, 
the argument has the form ‘q is T, because q is Z’, with ‘T’ standing for ‘true’, a standard 
formulation of the doxastic attitude marker that may or may not have been expressed in the 
actual discourse and can be added or substituted by the analyst. Such a ‘second-order 
predicate argument’ (‘2 pre’) has the shared proposition (q) as its fulcrum. An example is We 
only use 10% of our brain (q) is true (T), because we only use 10% of our brain (q) is said by 
Einstein (Z), which has we only use 10% of our brain (q) as its fulcrum. And finally, if the 
statements contain entirely different propositions, they have the doxastic attitude marker as 
their common element. Such arguments are called ‘second-order subject arguments’ (‘2 sub’) 
and have the form ‘q is T, because r is T’. An example is He must have gone to the pub (q) is 
true (T), because the interview is cancelled (r) is true (T), which has ‘is true’ (T) as its 
fulcrum. 
To summarize, the PTA in describing the characteristics of natural argument 
distinguishes between predicate and subject arguments as well as between first-order and 
second-order arguments. These characteristics are taken together in the notion of ‘argument 
form’, of which there are four. In the visualization of the PTA, arguments that share the same 
form are situated in the same quadrant, as pictured in Figure 4.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. The four quadrants of the PTA reflect the four basic argument forms 
 
The third characteristic of arguments that constitutes the theoretical framework of the PTA is 
the so-called ‘argument substance’, i.e., the specific combination of types of statements. This 
characteristic is determined on the basis of a widely used typology of statements that is 
developed in debate theory and distinguishes between statements of fact (F), statements of 
value (V), and statements of policy (P). An argument can thus be said to substantiate one of 
nine possible different combinations of types of statements, conventionally starting with the 
type of statement expressed in the conclusion followed by that in the premise: PP, PV, PF, 
VP, VV, VF, FP, FV, FF. The government should invest in jobs, because this will lead to 
economic growth, for instance, can be characterized as a PF argument, since it combines a 
statement of policy (P) in its conclusion with a statement of fact (F) in its premise. 
 As is clear from this exposition, the analyst, in order to identify the type of any natural 
argument under scrutiny in terms of the PTA, should classify it in terms of the three 
constituents of its theoretical framework, namely as (1) a first-order or second-order 
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argument; (2) a predicate or subject argument; and (3) as one out of nine possible 
combinations of types of statements. The superposition of these three partial characterizations 
yields what is called the ‘systematic name’ of the argument. To illustrate this notion, Table 1 
provides the systematic names of the examples of arguments discussed above. 
 
example argument form argument 
substance 
systematic 
name 
Unauthorized downloading (a) is not theft (X) 
(V), because unauthorized downloading (a) does 
not deprive the original owner of the use of an 
object (Y) (F) 
a is X, because a is Y VF 1 pre VF 
Cycling on the grass (a) is prohibited (X), 
because walking on the grass (b) is prohibited (X) 
a is X, because b is X VV 1 sub VV 
He must have gone to the pub (q) is true (T), 
because the interview is cancelled (r) is true (T) 
q is T, because r is T VV 2 sub VV 
We only use 10% of our brain (q) is true (T), 
because we only use 10% of our brain (q) is said 
by Einstein (Z) 
q is T, because q is Z VF 2 pre VF 
 
Table 1. Systematic names of examples instantiating the four basic argument forms 
 
Assuming these three constituents and the corresponding possibilities, the PTA distinguishes 
between 2 x 2 x 9 = 36 systematic types of argument. While situating argument types that 
share the same form in the same quadrant, the additional constituent of the argument 
substance is added to the visualization of the PTA by horizontally distributing the 
combinations in the systematic variation pictured in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The framework of the PTA allows for 36 systematic types of argument  
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3. Formulating the ‘argumentative lever’ 
 
As said above, the PTA does not include what is traditionally called a ‘connecting premise’ 
or ‘missing premise’ in its conceptualization of argument. Instead, the analyst using the PTA 
for evaluative purposes derives what is called the ‘argumentative lever’ from the 
identification of the argument. In this section, I describe how such derivation takes place. I 
first present the most recent version of the so-called ‘Argument Type Identification Procedure 
(ATIP)’, which is developed to help the analyst to identify the type of any argument 
expressed in natural language.5 Then, I explain how to formulate the argumentative lever 
based on this identification. 
 
The ATIP starts with a functional analysis of the elements of the two statements that have 
been recognized as the ‘conclusion’ and the ‘premise’ of the argument under scrutiny and 
results in labelling that argument with a type indicator that systematically summarizes its 
characteristics. The procedure consists of several steps, which are explained below and 
illustrated through an example. 
 
 
Step 1 – Label the textual elements 
 
The theoretical framework of the PTA takes an argument to consist of two connected 
statements, one functioning as the ‘conclusion’ and the other as the ‘premise’ (Wagemans 
2019, p. 60). To identify the type of argument, the analyst should first label its textual 
elements based on their pragmatic function. The following labels are in use: 
▪ the text may contain a ‘connector’ such as because or therefore indicating the 
function of the statements as ‘conclusion’ and ‘premise’ (for lists of such 
indicators see, e.g., van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans 2007; Stab 
and Gurevych 2017) 
▪ the statements usually contain a ‘subject’, i.e., an entity about which something is 
said, and a ‘predicate’, i.e., what is said about that entity  
▪ the subject and predicate together form the ‘propositional content’ of the statement  
▪ apart from this propositional content, the statement may contain a ‘doxastic 
commissive’ such as we believe that, it is true that, and in my humble opinion, 
which are linguistic expressions of the arguer’s commitment regarding the 
acceptability of the propositional content (Wagemans 2019, pp. 62-64) 
▪ the statement may also contain a ‘doxastic directive’ such as you should accept 
that, which is a linguistic expression of the arguer’s goal of convincing the 
addressee of the acceptability of the propositional content of the conclusion. 
 
 
5 The version presented here is adapted from Wagemans (2020). 
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Step 2 – Standardize the argument 
 
The labelling of the elements of the argument enables the analyst to reformulate it in the 
standard form “[subject (conclusion)] [predicate (conclusion)], because [subject (premise)] 
[predicate (premise)]”. Such standardization may involve several transformations of the 
original text: 
▪ regarding the statements 
- reordering of the statements to reflect the standard form “conclusion, because 
premise” 
▪ regarding the connector 
- addition of the standard connector because between the conclusion and the 
premise 
- substitution of the original connector by the standard connector because 
▪ regarding the non-propositional elements of the statements 
- hiding of the doxastic commissives and directives 
▪ regarding the propositional content of the statements 
- anaphora resolution, i.e., the substitution of specific elements so that identical 
entities are referred to by identical words (preferably the most informative 
ones) 
- changing active to passive voice or the other way around in order to find a 
common subject or predicate. 
 
 
 
Example 1 – original text 
Since the suspect left a long trace of rubber on the road, we believe that he was driving fast 
 
Functional analysis of the elements of the statements 
 
element       function 
since       connector 
the suspect left a long trace of rubber on the road  propositional content (premise) 
the suspect      subject (premise) 
left a long trace of rubber on the road   predicate (premise) 
we believe that       doxastic commissive (conclusion) 
he was driving fast     propositional content (conclusion) 
he       subject (conclusion) 
was driving fast      predicate (conclusion) 
 
Example 1 – original text 
Since the suspect left a long trace of rubber on the road, we believe that he was driving fast 
 
Reformulations toward the standardized version 
 
reformulation transformation 
We believe that he was driving fast, since the suspect left a long trace of 
rubber on the road 
reordering of the statements 
We believe that he was driving fast, because the suspect left a long 
trace of rubber on the road  
substitution of the connector 
since by because 
He was driving fast, because the suspect left a long trace of rubber on 
the road 
hiding of the doxastic 
commissive we believe 
The suspect was driving fast, because the suspect left a long trace of 
rubber on the road 
substitution of he by the 
suspect (anaphora resolution) 
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Step 3 – Determine the argument form 
 
The ‘argument form’ is an abstract representation of the specific constellation of the subjects 
and predicates expressed in the conclusion and the premise of the argument. Closely 
following logical conventions, subjects are indicated with letters a, b, etc., predicates with 
letters X, Y, etc. (predicates ‘⊤’ and ‘⊥’ expressing doxastic commitments ‘true’ and ‘false’), 
and complete propositions with letters p, q, etc.  
 
Within the theoretical framework of the PTA, four basic argument forms are distinguished, 
which is reflected in the visual representation of the table as divided into four quadrants 
(Wagemans 2019, pp. 64-67). Table 2 contains an overview of these forms, their names, and 
the corresponding quadrant of the table: 
 
argument form name quadrant 
a is X, because a is Y first-order predicate argument alpha 
a is X, because b is X first-order subject argument beta 
q is ⊤, because r is ⊤ second-order subject argument gamma 
q is ⊤, because q is Z second-order predicate argument delta 
 
Table 2. Argument forms distinguished in the PTA 
 
For completing this step in the procedure, the analyst can use the decision tree pictured in 
Figure 6, which contains three heuristic questions as well as the corresponding instructions 
and outcomes depending on the answers to these questions. 
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Figure 6. Decision tree for determining the argument form 
 
  
pre conference version 
11 
 
 
 
Step 4 – Determine the argument substance 
 
Apart from by its ‘argument form’, each type of argument distinguished within the theoretical 
framework of the PTA is characterized by its ‘argument substance’ (Wagemans 2016, pp. 7-
8). This notion is defined as the specific combination of types of statements the argument 
instantiates. The labelling of the type of statement is done in accordance with a widely used 
tripartite typology of statements developed within debate theory that consists of statements of 
fact (F), statements of value (V), and statements of policy (P). 
▪ a statement of fact (F) is defined as a description of a particular state of affairs that 
is or can be empirically observed in reality or that is or can be imagined to exist. 
In order for the analyst to distinguish them from statements of value, it may be 
helpful to consider the following subtypes and examples: 
- empirical statements, such as ‘The suspect left a long trace of rubber on the 
road’. 
- existential statements, such as ‘God exists’ 
- predictions, such as ‘The economy will grow’ 
▪ a statement of value (V) is defined as an evaluative judgment about a particular 
entity based on a subjective selection and weighing of assessment criteria. In order 
for the analyst to distinguish them from statements of fact, it may be helpful to 
consider the following subtypes and examples: 
- aesthetic judgments, such as ‘The Corrections is a great novel’ 
- moral or ethical judgments, such as ‘Circumcision is reprehensible’ 
- legal judgments, such as ‘Unauthorized copying is not theft’ 
- pragmatic judgments, such as ‘Our plan for reducing CO2-emission is 
feasible’ 
- logical judgments, such as ‘This proposition is true’ 
- hedonistic judgments, such as ‘Paragliding is fun’ 
▪ a statement of policy (P), which is defined as a directive statement that expresses 
an advice, an incitement, or an imperative. The analyst may recognize statements 
of policy because of the presence of the term ‘should’ in combination with a verb 
expressing a particular action. Examples are: 
- advice, such as ‘Children should not sleep with artificial lighting’ 
- incitements, such as ‘You should go to the gym’ 
- imperatives, such as ‘Go to your room’ 
By labelling both the conclusion and the premise of the argument in this way, the argument 
substance can be determined as one of the nine possible combinations of types of statements 
(FF, VF, PF, FV, VV, PV, FP, VP, PP). 
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Step 5 – Provide the systematic name of the argument 
 
The systematic name of an argument is a symbolic representation of the results of Step 3 and 
4 of this procedure and thus contains information regarding the argument form and the 
argument substance. It consists of: 
- the prefix “1” or “2”, indicating a first-order or a second-order argument 
- the infix “pre” or “sub”, indicating a predicate or subject argument 
- the suffix “FF”, “VF”, etc., indicating the types of statements instantiated by the argument 
 
 
 
After having presented how the analyst can identify the type of argument by making use of 
the Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP), I turn now explaining how they can 
derive the ‘argumentative lever’ from such identification. The lever of an argument is an 
expression of its underlying mechanism, which explains how a statement can establish or 
increase the acceptability of another statement. As such, the word ‘lever’ is taken from the 
same source domain as the word ‘fulcrum’. While the fulcrum is defined as the term – i.e., 
the subject or predicate – that the conclusion and the premise of the argument have in 
common, the lever is defined as the relationship between the non-common terms (Wagemans 
2019, p. 61). 
Now what is the lever of a concrete argument expressed in natural language such as 
the example used to illustrate the ATIP? The answer to this question depends on the extent to 
which the analyst has available information about (1) the characteristics of the argument as 
analyzed during the procedure and (2) the discursive context in which the argument has been 
put forward. To illustrate this point, I now provide progressively more concrete formulations 
of the lever of an example of natural argument, namely the famous opening statement of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysica.6 
 
Example 2 
All human beings by nature desire to know. A sign of this is our liking for the senses; for 
even apart from their usefulness we like them for themselves – especially the sense of sight, 
since we choose seeing above practically all the others, not only as an aid to action, but also 
when we have no intention of acting. The reason is that sight, more than any of the other 
senses, gives us knowledge of things and clarifies many differences among them. (Aristotle, 
Metaphysica 980a21-27, translation Irwin and Fine, 1995) 
 
If the analyst only uses the information about the argument form, the formulation of the lever 
will be a fairly abstract one. Following the ATIP, the argument in the beginning of this text 
can be reconstructed as All human beings by nature desire to know, because all human beings 
 
6 For more example analyses, please see www.periodic-table-of-arguments.org.  
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have a liking for the senses. This argument has the form ‘a is X, because a is Y’ and can 
therefore be identified as a first-order predicate argument. The lever, being defined as the 
relationship between the non-common terms, can then be formulated as the relationship 
between X and Y, so between by nature desire to know and have a liking for the senses. 
Levers for the different argument forms are specified in Table 3.  
 
argument form fulcrum abstract lever 
a is X, because a is Y a Y R  X 
a is X, because b is X X a R  b 
q is ⊤, because r is ⊤ T q R  r 
q is ⊤, because q is Z q Z R  T 
 
Table 3. Abstract levers based on information about the argument form 
 
To provide a more concrete formulation of the lever, the analyst can also take into account 
the argument substance. Following the ATIP, the argument can be identified as an FF 
argument. This means that the relationship between the predicates can be seen as a 
relationship between two different factual properties attributed to the same subject. At this 
point, the analyst can use the various ‘1 pre FF’ arguments already identified in the PTA as a 
heuristic. As pictured in Figure 7, a visualization of the Alpha Quadrant hosting all the first-
order predicate arguments, the ‘1 pre FF’ arguments have levers formulated as ‘Y is a sign for 
X’, ‘Y is a cause of X’, ‘Y is an effect of X’, and ‘Y is correlated with X’.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The Alpha Quadrant of the PTA.  
 
As mentioned above, to justify the choice of concrete lever that fits the argument under 
scrutiny, the analyst can also refer to the discursive context in which the argument has been 
put forward. In this case, Aristotle explicitly uses the term ‘sign’ to qualify the argumentative 
relationship between the conclusion and premise, thereby giving the analyst an extra reason 
to formulate the lever as have a liking for the senses is a sign for by nature desire to know. 
Once the lever has been formulated, its solidity can be evaluated. As explained in 
Hinton and Wagemans (forthcoming), the evaluation of this aspect of the argument reflects 
both the informal logic tradition of questioning the relevance and sufficiency of an argument 
and the dialectical tradition of asking critical questions, some of which pertain to the 
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connection between the premise and the conclusion of the argument.7 In this case, to examine 
the solidity of the lever, the evaluator should examine the extent to which have a liking for 
the senses is a sign for by nature desire to know. Although the outcome of the evaluation is a 
subjective judgement of the evaluator, by following the method just explained such judgment 
pertains to an expression of the underlying mechanism of the argument that is systematically 
derived from an identification of its type. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The argument categorization framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA) takes an 
argument to consist of only two statements, one functioning as the premise and the other as 
the conclusion, which means that it excludes from its conceptualization of argument the 
element traditionally called the ‘connecting premise’ or ‘missing premise’. Given that this 
element is one of the usual objects of evaluation of an argument, I addressed in this paper the 
question of how the PTA can be used for evaluative purposes by explaining how the analyst 
can derive the so-called ‘lever’ of an argument from an identification of its type.  
 The method, so I believe, has some advantages compared to traditional ways of 
analyzing the connection between the premise and conclusion of an argument. The first 
advantage concerns its procedural nature. Different from comparative methods, which 
identify connecting premises based on a subjective comparison with a list of predefined 
argument schemes, the lever is derived from a systematic analysis of the characteristics of the 
argument as expressed in the original text. Following this procedural method not only makes 
the analysis more transparent and robust but also prevents the analyst from reconstructing the 
text based on preconceived ideas of what an argument should consist of and therefore from 
running the risk of providing a biased evaluation of how the premise establishes or increases 
the acceptability of the conclusion. 
 A second advantage of deriving the lever instead of adding a predefined missing 
premise is that such a lever can be formulated on different levels of concreteness, depending 
on the information the analyst has available. Based on the argument form, the lever can be 
formulated more abstractly, for instance, as a relationship between predicates. Bringing in 
additional information about the argument substance enables the analyst to formulate the 
lever, for example, as a relationship between factual properties. If there is textual evidence 
about how the arguer expresses the relationship between the non-common terms, like in the 
case of the example argument taken from Aristotle’s Metaphysica discussed above, the 
analyst can use the same keyword as the arguer to formulate the lever of the argument. I think 
such cautiousness in providing a concrete formulation of the lever would again prevent the 
analyst from engaging in the hermeneutical activity of ‘hineininterpretieren’. 
  Thirdly and finally, the development of a procedural instead of a comparative method 
for argument identification and evaluation prepares the ground for a further formalization of 
these activities, which is a necessary step for the subsequent development of computational 
applications.8 As said above, the outcome of an assessment of the solidity of the lever of an 
argument is a subjective judgment of the evaluator. And I doubt whether such judgment can 
ever be given by an AI engine, if this would be desirable at all. But I also think that being 
aware of the importance of humans having the last word about what they find acceptable does 
not have to turn us into techno-repellent Luddites. On the contrary, it may well be the case 
that sufficiently formalized argumentation theoretical insights are crucial for developing 
 
7 See, e.g., de Jong (2019). 
8 An elaboration of this method can be found in Gobbo, Benini and Wagemans (2019). 
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explainable, white-box AI engines that can assist humans in performing vital tasks such as 
making decisions based on facts and reasonable arguments. 
By contrasting the procedural method presented in this paper with the traditional 
comparative method, I do not mean to depreciate the use of classical and modern dialectical 
and rhetorical accounts of the types of argument. The research presented in this paper has 
only scratched the surface of the connection between the systematic names used in the 
theoretical framework of the PTA and the traditional names of the types of arguments. In 
several of the cases analyzed so far, the keyword used in the formulation of the lever is also 
to be found in the traditional name. If the lever contains, for instance, the term ‘sign’ in order 
to substantiate the relationship between the predicates, the corresponding traditional name of 
the argument is ‘argument from sign’. Extensive research into these correspondences, I 
believe, would greatly benefit the further systematization of argument description and 
classification, which is something that motivated the development of the PTA in the first 
place. 
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